This study examines the competitiveness of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) on the basis of trading activities of different market makers for a sample of FTSE-100 component stocks. Specifically, the relations studied between market shares of individual market makers and their price-and quantity-setting behavior, preferenced trading activities, and trading profitability infer the competitiveness of the London market. The results show that market makers can obtain relatively large shares of public order flows through posting competitive prices with significant quote depths. Because preferenced trading is limited to small-sized trades, market share leaders do not rely on it in securing public order flow on the London market. In addition, the trading profitability of LSE market makers is not driven by market share; rather those market makers assuming trading risks are rewarded with higher spread margins. The overall findings from the study indicate that the LSE is a competitive dealership market.
Is the London Market Competitive? A Study of Trading Behavior of London Market Makers

I. Introduction
The quality of dealership markets largely depends on whether market makers really compete for investors' order flow by quoting competitive prices at which they are willing to buy (bid price) and sell (ask price). A competitive dealership market will drive the bid-ask spread to the level of marginal cost of market making. To encourage the competition, major dealership markets, such as Nasdaq and London Stock Exchange (LSE), usually assign multiple market makers to a particular stock; however, the competitiveness of dealership markets has been a widely debated issue in recent years. For instance, although the number of market makers for the actively traded stocks often reaches 30 to 60, market makers' quoting processes exhibit imperfect competition on the Nasdaq market [Christie, Harris, and Schultz (1994) and ].
The quality of trading execution on the LSE market has been carefully examined by two major studies by Hanson, Naik, and Viswanathan (HNV) (1998 and 1999) . In the first paper, HNV compile evidence that market makers posting competitive quotes execute a large proportion of the public order flow, which is expected of a competitive dealership market. In the second paper, HNV report that preferencing and internalization do not worsen the quality of execution on the LSE even about 90 percent order flow are either preferenced or internalized or both. Their results also imply that preferencing and internalization do not adversely affect the competitiveness of London market because no evidence is found on the relationship between quoted inside spread and trades that are preferenced (or internalized) as well as the relationship between preferenced trades and market maker profitability. HNV conclude that their findings are not consistent with the "collusion" hypothesis but provide support to the "costly negotiation with heterogeneous dealers and customer-dealer relationship" hypothesis. Nevertheless, they do not draw any explicit conclusion on the competitiveness of the London market.
Assessing the competitiveness of any market is a broad, open-ended question that involves multiple facets of market characteristics. Hence, without a specific focus, it is a difficult empirical question to address. The main purpose of this study is to corroborate HNV findings from a different angle. This paper's approach is unique in that the trading behavior of individual market makers is highlighted to study the relationships between market share and various characteristics describing market making activities on the LSE market (e.g., timelength of competitive quotes, quote depth, preferenced trades, and trading profitability). This study's detailed analysis of the trading behavior of individual market makers enables us to direct examination of the competitiveness of a dealership market. The underlying idea of this paper is that if the London dealership market is competitive, then: (i) the competition in price-and quantitysetting among market makers should play a predominant role in determining the market shares of market makers; (ii) preferenced trades should be a minor factor in determining the market share of market makers; and (iii) the profitability of LSE market makers should be driven not by market share but by risk-taking.
Our overall findings indicate that the LSE is a competitive dealership market with the following characteristics:
• Market makers obtain a relatively large share of public order flows through posting competitive prices with great quote depths.
• Because preferenced trading is largely limited to small-sized trades, market share leaders do not rely on it in securing public order flow.
• A higher profitability is observed for the market makers with larger market shares. This profitability is, however, explained by risk-taking but not by monopoly power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces theories, past evidence, and three hypotheses to be tested in examining the market competitiveness. Section III discusses the background and data on London market makers. Section IV presents empirical findings. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Theories, Past Evidence, and Testable Hypotheses
A. Hypothesis on the Relationship between Market Share and Quoted Prices and Quantities
The relationship between market share and competitive quotes has been studied extensively. For example, the theoretical models of dealership markets developed by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) are built on the assumption that the market maker improving quotes earns all of the public order flow. The inventory model developed by Ho and Stoll (1983) assumes that market makers control their inventories through the adjustment of their quotes.
They predict that the distribution of inventories is strongly related to the quote placement behavior of market makers. This prediction is empirically supported by HNV (1998). However, , , Huang and Stoll (1996) , and HNV (1999) question the competitiveness of dealership markets based on their observations of either the Nasdaq or the LSE market.
Using individual market makers' quoting behavior on the London market, we focus on the relationship between market share and competitive quotes. One unique aspect of this study is the explicit consideration of quote-depths (quantity) in addition to traditional bid and ask quotes (prices). The underlying motivation is that the competition on the LSE is more intense in quote depths rather than price quotes as London market makers infrequently adjust their price quotes. Thus, the first hypothesis states:
H1:
A market maker gains market share of trading through his competitive price-and quantity-setting behavior.
B. Hypothesis on the Relationship between Market Share and Preferenced Trades
The adverse impact of preferenced trades on the execution quality of stock trading in dealership markets has received considerable attention. Battalio and Holden (1996) , Dutta and Madhavan (1997) , Kandel and Marx (1999) indicate that preferenced and internalized arrangements have negative consequences for the quality of execution in a dealership market. Market makers do not possess the incentives to improve the best quotes because it does not necessarily guarantee the execution of incoming orders, which, in turn, leads to inferior execution , , Huang and Stoll (1996) , Barclay (1997) , Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) ]. As a result, preferencing and internalization have recently come under considerable regulatory scrutiny. For the LSE market, HNV (1999) report preferenced trades pay higher spreads but they do not generate higher profits for market makers.
Hence, they rely on the "costly search and trading relationship" hypothesis rather than the collusive behavior among market makers.
Two idiosyncratic features of the LSE should be noted. First, the competition of quoted prices among market makers is severely limited as indicated by infrequent revision of quoted prices by market makers. Quoted prices do not differ among market makers within a given stock. Instead, the variation in quoted depths is very large, indicating an important role of the quantity-setting. It is not an exaggeration that London market makers compete for the public order flows based on quantity rather than price. Second, unlike the Nasdaq market, preferenced trading activities are largely confined to small-sized trades.
In reflection of the above two idiosyncratic features of the London market, we re-investigate the relationship between the market share and preferenced trading using a new definition of preferenced trades. We re-define preferenced trades by imposing two criteria covering both price and quantity as opposed to HNV's single criterion based on price as discussed in the following section.
Hence, it leads to the second hypothesis on the relationship between market share and preferenced trades:
H2: Preferenced trades should be a minor factor in determining market share of trading if the LSE market is competitive.
C. Hypothesis on the Role of Monopoly in the Relationship between Market Share and Trading Profitability
The sources of trading profits earned by LSE market makers and their impact on market shares are the main focus of third hypothesis. Glosten (1989) suggests that a monopolistic specialist acts strategically to maximize his profit.
Empirical evidence is somewhat ambiguous. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) find that NYSE specialists are good short-term traders but undistinguished longterm speculators. However, Neuberger and Hansch (1996) observe that London market makers do trade strategically by combining gainful and money-losing trades. HNV (1999) report that London market makers make money on small trades, break-even on large trades, but lose money on medium-sized trades.
They further report that preferenced trades do not entail profits for market makers.
In order to gain a better understanding of profit pictures for London market makers, we compare trading profits among three groups of market makers: the group with largest market share, the group with smallest market share, and the middle group. For example, if the group with the largest market makers exercises monopoly power, one would expect that the leading market makers earn profits across all trades of differing sizes since monopoly power would not be exercised in a discriminatory manner. If, on the other hand, the leading market makers earn profits only from large-sized trades, then their profitability must be explained by something else. Deducting from this logic, we propose the compensation for risk-taking by market makers as a possible explanation since large-sized trades are riskier than small-sized trades. Hence, we propose the third hypothesis on the relationship between market share and trading profitability:
H3:
If the London market is a competitive dealership market, market share leaders should earn relatively higher profitability by taking high trading risk.
III. Background and Data Description on LSE Market Makers
A. Data Description
Since 1986, the LSE operated as a dealership market and permitted LSE members to register as market makers in any stock. They are obliged to post two-way quotes on the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) systems, which are available to all LSE members. The SEAQ screen specifies the market maker's name and his posted quotes and quantities for which his quotes are firm.
The minimum size that the market maker can quote is the normal market size (NMS). Although the NMS varies from stock to stock, it corresponds roughly to 2.5% of average daily volume for a given stock. Any market maker regardless of his current posted quotes and quantities can execute public orders; however, the market maker must at least match the best quotes on the SEAQ screen when executing (best execution). If the order is larger than the quoted size, no such rule applies and price can be negotiated freely between the market maker and investors. Similar to the Nasdaq market, arrangements by brokers sending order flows to any market maker are legal. Table 1 along with SEAQ stock codes.
[Insert Table 1 ] Table 2 provides some background information regarding the 25 sample stocks. Ordinarily, the average number of market makers assigned to a given stock amounts to 17. This number is much smaller than 30 to 60 for actively traded stocks on the Nasdaq market. During the three-month study period covering 61 trading days, an average of 7,035 quote revisions accrued for a given stock, which is equivalent to seven daily quote revisions per market maker.
In other words, a typical LSE market maker will hold his quotation for over one hour before making the next move. Quite a contrast to the high frequency of quotes revisions on the Nasdaq market where actively traded stocks experience average daily quote revisions of more than 70. The LSE trading activity is also much less active than the Nasdaq market. The 21,046 trades recorded by 17 market makers for a period of 61 trading days is equivalent to only about 20 trades per market maker per trading day. However, the LSE's average trade size of over 15,000 shares would be considered large by the Nasdaq standard.
[Insert Table 2] Additional details on market makers' quoting behavior are reported in Table 3 . Bid-ask spreads quoted by London market makers do not change often throughout a trading day, which implies that the market makers are slow in updating their quotes during trading time. Similar results are also reported by HNV (1998).
On the LSE market, the inside spread is about one-half of the quoted spread (2.86 vs. 5.69), suggesting that market makers usually post competitive quotes only at one side. Though market makers infrequently change their quotes, they are willing to accept large public orders. The time-weighted average quote depth exceeds 76,000 shares, a significant number as compared to the average quote size on the Nasdaq market. This sizable quote depth reflects the characteristics of the London market as an institutional market and may become an effective tool for market makers competing for the public order flow.
[Insert Table 3 ] Table 4 documents the characteristics of trades executed by market makers. As summarized in the first five columns, approximately 80% of actual trades belong to the categories under 10,000 shares. However, over 92% of trading volume belongs to the category of 10,000 shares or more as shown in the last five columns. This unique feature of LSE trades will certainly influence the market making process as discussed in the later sections.
[Insert Table 4 ] Table 5 trading profitability. In addition to mean, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation, we also report the combined statistics for three market makers with the largest market shares of trades (to be referred to as the top 3 market makers) and the remaining market makers.
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B. Key Measurement Variables
Market Share of Trading: Panel A of Table 5 reports summary statistics for the market share of trading. Quote Depth: In order to properly measure quote competitiveness of individual market makers, we also focus on quote depths. Given infrequent changes in bidask spreads, LSE market makers compete on quote depths. Thus, we compute the time-weighted average of quote depth for each market maker over the entire sample period. As presented in panel C of Table 5 , a typical market maker is willing to accept public orders with at least 76,000 shares at his quoted prices.
Given the average price of £5 recorded for the sample stocks, this depth is 4
The relative time-length of quotes remaining competitive is defined as: CQ jk =INT jk /T jk , where, INT jk denotes the time market maker j's quotes remain competitive for stock k and T jk denotes market maker j's total quoting time. Thus, CQ jk serves as a direct measure of a market maker's competitiveness. equivalent to over £380,000, which suggests LSE's market depth as an institutional market in terms of its liquidity. The top 3 market makers are willing to accommodate an incoming order as large as over 86,000 shares, that is 20 percent more than the size the remaining market makers. Greater quote depths observed for the top 3 market makers also imply higher trading risks due to potential inventory imbalance and adverse selection.
[Insert Table 5] Preferenced Trading: Preferenced trading activities are measured with the ratio of the number of preferenced trading shares to the total volume executed by a market maker. We impose the following two criteria to identify preferenced trades for a market maker: (i) the quote is not located on the inside; and (ii) the trade size is not greater than quote size. The latter condition is introduced in view of the nature of the LSE market dominated by institutional investors and large-sized trades. In London, market makers are required to match the best quotes for orders that do not exceed the quote size. For orders greater than the quote size, however, no such rule is imposed and the prices can be negotiated freely [HNV (1999 [HNV ( , p. 1806 ]. Therefore, it is quite possible that the large size orders tend to be non-preferenced. Due to these unique characteristics of the London market, quote depth is a critically important consideration for traders.
When a trade negotiates large-sized trades, both price quote and quote depth are usually considered in London. Therefore, liquidity services provided by market makers become a critical factor for the trade execution on the LSE market. The second condition differentiates our definition of preference trading from that of HNV (1999).
Summary statistics for the relative preferenced trading activity are reported in Panel D of Table 5 . 5 In terms of trading volume, on average, 33 percent of shares are preferenced to specific market makers. Given two groups of market makers sorted by market shares, preferenced trading volume contributes 20% and 36% of total trading volume of the top 3 market makers and the remaining market makers, respectively. This finding is interesting because it implies that LSE market makers with larger market shares do not primarily depend on the preferencing arrangements to gain their market shares of trading. Note that the percentage of preferenced trading reported in Panel D is lower than 71% reported by HNV (1999) . This discrepancy is attributed to the second condition on quote depth defining preferenced trading. As a result, HNV's preferenced trades include more large trades. With HNV's definition, the percentage of preferenced trades increases by 15% to 20%. Even with this change, this paper's findings still hold; preferenced trades do not play a prominent role in concentrating market-making activities to a handful of market makers as confirmed in the following section. The relative size of preferenced trading activities (PT jk ) for market maker j in stock k is defined as:
where PV jk and TV jk denote preferenced trading volume and total trading volume of market maker j in stock k over the entire sample period.
Trading Profitability: To measure the trading profitability of a market maker, we calculate total profit margin, spread margin, and position margin following the definitions introduced by Neuberger (1992), Sofianos (1995) , and, more recently, HNV (1999) . Panel E of Table 5 reports summary statistics for three profit measures. Overall trading profitability dramatically differs across market makers.
On average, market makers suffer from losses from market making with an average profit margin of -13 basis points. The top 3 market makers, however, earn small profits, while the remaining market makers lose money in the magnitude of 16 basis points. Since the profit margin is the sum of the spread margin and the position margin, Table 5 also presents summary statistics on both types as summarized in Sections 2 and 3. London market makers generally earn positive spread margins but negative position margins with means of 9 and -22 base points, respectively. The results indicate that market makers on the LSE do face a serious adverse selection problem. The source of the top 3 market makers' higher profit margins is their spread margins. No difference in position margins, however, is observed between the two subgroups, which implies no difference in trading skills. The observed differences in trading profitability (especially spread margins) among London market makers should be interpreted as the evidence that they are rewarded for their high risk taking trading behavior.
IV. Empirical Findings
In order to highlight differing trading behavior among the LSE market makers, we classify them into 10 groups based on the market share of trading with Group 1 market makers having the largest relative market shares and Group 10 market makers having the smallest shares. We standardize four key variables measuring time-lengths of quotes remaining competitive, quote depth, preferenced trading, and trading profitability to control for the cross-sectional heterogeneity across 25 stocks in the sample. The standardized variables are then used as dependent variables in the following regression model: Table 6 .
A. Differences in Time-Lengths of Competitive Quotes
Regression results for the competitive quotation ratios are shown in Panel A of 
B. Differences in Quote Depths
Regression results for quotation depths are summarized Panel B of Table 6 . [Insert Table 6 ]
C. Differences in Preferenced Trading
Regression results for the preferenced trading are reported in Panel C of Table 6 . The coefficients estimated for the top two groups with largest market shares are negative but significant, while those estimated for bottom groups with smallest market shares are positive and significant. The results imply that preferenced trading is more prevalent among the market makers with smaller market shares. More importantly, the market makers with larger market shares do not appear to rely on preferenced trading arrangements in securing public order flow on the London market.
A question, however, remains as to why a negative relationship exists between the market share of trading and the preferenced trading activity on the LSE. From the size distribution for preferenced and non-preferenced trades as summarized in Table 7 , the London market exhibits its own idiosyncratic feature in that a large proportion of preferenced trades fall into the small size categories.
Over 55% of the trades are under 1,000 shares, which is a contrast to 43% recorded for non-preferenced trades. On the other hand, more than 31% of nonpreferenced trades belong to the over 10,000 shares category as opposed to less than 13% for preferenced trades. Since large-sized trades predominantly influence the relative market share of trading in terms of volume, an increase in trading volume is accompanied with the decline of the proportion of preferenced trading volume.
[Insert Table 7 ]
D. Differences in Trading Profitability
Panel D of Table 6 An important question then is why LSE market makers with large market shares are able to achieve higher spread margins than the average market makers. Two possible reasons may be cited: (i) monopoly power of a certain group of market makers; and (ii) reward for high risk-taking. If a certain group of market makers enjoy monopoly power, one may expect that this group would be able to consistently charge large spread margins regardless of the size of trades.
If not, the reward for risk-taking hypothesis will better explain. To examine this issue, spread margins are computed for the top 3 market makers and the remaining market makers in the trades of different size categories. Table 8 reports the result. For the trades under 5,000 shares, the spread margins do not differ significantly between the top 3 market makers and the remaining market makers. However, the differences emerge when trade size increases above 5,000 shares or more. The top 3 market makers obtain significantly higher spread margins than the others. For example, given a trade in the 5,000 to 10,000 shares range, the spread margin difference is 12 basis points, which is significantly different from zero. For those trades in excess of 10,000 shares, the difference between these two groups reaches 24 basis points. Because positive spread margins earned by the top three market makers do not consistently appear across the trades of all sizes, monopolistic power does not appear to be the main cause of the observed profits for the market makers with large market shares. Since market makers with large market shares of trading earn relatively greater spread margins and the large trades are more likely associated with high trading risks, the second reason appears to be a better explanation. Additionally, the observed position margins for large-sized trades can not be attributed to preferenced trading which prevails among small-sized transactions.
[Insert Table 8 ]
E. Cross-Sectional Regression Approach
In order to assess the relation between market shares of trading and the four key variables (measuring time-lengths of quotes remaining competitive, quote depths, preferenced trades, and profitability), the following cross-sectional regressions are used. The only difference between two regression models is that two components of trading profits, spread margins and position margins, are explicitly recognized in equation (3).
MS jk = α 0 + α 1 CQ jk + α 2 QD jk + α 3 PT jk + α 4 TP jk + ε jk,;
MS jk = β 0 + β 1 CQ jk + β 2 QD jk + β 3 PT jk + β 4 SM jk + β 5 PM jk + μ jk (
Where, MS jk = market share of market maker j in stock k;
CQ jk = length of time that quotes remain competitive;
QD jk = quote depth;
PT jk = preferenced trading;
TP jk , SM jk , and PM jk denote total profit margins, spread margins, and position margins; and ε jk and μ jk are random disturbance terms.
All variables are standardized to purge cross-sectional heterogeneity across stocks. The regression results summarized in Table 9 are consistent with the predictions under the three hypotheses. Significantly positive coefficients estimated for two variables measuring time-lengths of quotes remaining competitive (CQ) and quote depths (QD) indicate that the market makers who issue competitive quotes with greater depths can gain larger proportion of public orders in support of the first hypothesis.
[Insert Table 9] One should be careful in interpreting the negative coefficient for the Combining with the regression results based on equation (2), market makers with high trading volume gain relatively higher trading profitability as compensation for their risk-taking, which is consistent with the third hypothesis.
V. Conclusions
In this study, we have examined competitiveness of the LSE on the basis of Empirical evidence suggests that market makers with large market shares of trading enjoy higher profit margins than the average market makers; and, further, that this profitability is attributed to not position margins but spread margins.
This result is interpreted as the compensation for risk-taking associated with large-sized trades rather than monopoly power enjoyed by the market makers with a large market share.
In conclusion, the LSE is a competitive dealership market characterized by the following:
• LSE market makers obtain a relatively large share of public order flows through posting competitive prices with great quote depths.
• Because preferenced trading is limited to small-sized trades, market share leaders do not rely on it in securing public order flow on the London market.
• A higher profitability is observed for the market makers with larger market
shares. This profitability is explained by risk-taking, not monopoly power. Panel A reports summary statistics for market share of trading (MS) variable. MS is defined as MS js = (BV js +SV js ) / ∑ Ns j=1 (BV js +SV js ), j=1,…,N s . MS js denotes the market maker j's market share of trading in stock s, and BV js and SV js denote the market maker j's total purchasing volume and selling volume in stock s over the study period, respectively. N s denotes the number of market makers in stock s. Top 3 is the average market share of top three market makers with the largest shares. Rest is the average market share of the remaining market makers. Panel B reports summary statistics for time-lengths of competitive quotes (CQ). CQ is defined as CQ js = (BT js +AT js ) / T js where BT js and AT js denote the times of market maker j's quotes staying at the inside bid price and the inside ask price over sample period, respectively, and T js denotes market maker j's total quoting time over study period. Top 3 is the average CQ for three market makers with the largest market shares and Rest is the average CQ for the remaining market makers. (1) where D 1 ..D 4 are dummy variables that are defined in the following manner. All market makers are sorted into 10 groups based on their relative market shares of trading. The market makers in Group 1 have the largest relative market shares, and the market makers in Group 10 have the smallest market shares. D 1 = 1 if the market maker belongs to Group 1 or 0 otherwise; D 2 = 1 if the market maker belongs to Group 2 or 0 otherwise; D 3 = 1 if the market maker belongs to Group 9 or 0 otherwise; D 4 = 1 if the market maker belongs to Group 10 or 0 otherwise; e jk denotes a random disturbance term; and j and k denote market maker and stock, respectively. Four key variables are used as the dependent variable. They are: (i) time-length of competitive quotes; (ii) quote depth; (iii) preferenced trading; and (iv) trading profitability. These variables are standardized to control for the cross-sectional heterogeneity across stocks. For each dummy variable, the estimated coefficients and corresponding t values are reported in the parentheses. F-value and number of observations (Obs) are also reported. The relations between market shares of trading and the four key variables (measuring time-lengths of quotes remaining competitive, quote depths, preferenced trades, and profitability) are evaluated using the following crosssectional regressions:
________________________________________________________________
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MS jk = β 0 + β 1 CQ jk + β 2 QD jk + β 3 PT jk + β 4 SM jk + β 5 PM jk + μ jk
where, MS jk = market share of market maker j in stock k; CQ jk = length of time that quotes remain competitive; QD jk = quote depth; PT jk = preferenced trading; TP jk , SM jk , and PM jk denote total profit margins, spread margins, and position margins; and ε jk and μ jk are random disturbance terms.
All variables are standardized to purge cross-sectional heterogeneity across stocks. 
